In 1996, the U.S. Congress passed the welfare reform law that fulfilled Bill Clinton's electoral promise to change "welfare as we know it." This law affirms that a broad spectrum of sociomedical pathology-welfare dependency, poverty and child poverty, crime, drug abuse, mental illness and more generally illness, child abuse and neglect, low cognitive attainment, low educational aspirations, or couple breakup-is produced by "illegitimacy" and by a particular subject that engages in such pathological reproductive practices: the poor, young, black, single mother on welfare. Roughly around the same time, but in a slightly different governmental sector, the national family-planning strategies elaborated by the Department of Health and Social Services (DHHS) for the decades 1990-2010 are blaming a similar spectrum of pathologywelfare dependency, child abuse and neglect, reduced maternal educational attainment and employment opportunity, and higher infant risk of low birth weight or of death during its first year-on "unplanned pregnancies" and a subject that fails to plan: interestingly, the same teenage, poor, black single mother on welfare. Both governmental initiatives continue to have serious consequences on the lives of the subjects the state holds responsible for engendering those "national crises" in the United States. The starting questions of this book, therefore, were: What is the nature of the relations between those two governmental framings of social reality? What accounts for the convergences (and differences) in the ways those two in theory distinct governmental sectors demarcate reality and subjects and act upon them? However, those realities and subjects showed themselves to be less straightforward than initially assumed, if by straightforward we mean that social policy results from a deliberate and coherent governmental plan. Even at the most obvious level, the similarities between the modalities of diagnosing and curing the social in the welfare and family-planning governmental fields could not be attributed to an impeccable central coordination of governmental rationalities and practices, simply because the policies investigated extended over three different administrations, two Republican and one Democrat. Could it be, then, that governmental statements in both apparatuses were based not only on one administration's or department's understanding of truth and the good, but also on wider logics that frame contemporary political reality in the United States and that are neither strictly restricted to the domain of the State nor belong to any one government or political organization? To answer this question, the analysis had to consider new questions: What are the onto-epistemological and moral conditions of possibility of governmental statements? More specifically, what are the practices of truth and power that make possible the construction of U.S. national welfare and family-planning strategies around the identity of an inadequate, "irresponsible" mother? And could we affirm, more generally, that those practices are structured by assumptions that are foundational for liberal thinking? Foundational enough to be assumed self-evident when liberal governing structures reality? This affirmation necessitated extending the problematique of the research to question the nature of liberal government: the relation between government, power, and subjectivity formation in liberalism and the nature of practices through which certain liberal identities are made true and universal, as well as the possibilities left for political resistance in the densely populated governmental field that, to a large extent, determines the shape of the political in liberal nation-states.
Family Planning as Liberal Governmental Apparatus
The central question of this book is, Why is unplanned pregnancy a dangerous event for liberal governing in the United States? If effecting divisions between the "true" and the "false" according to the dominant onto-epistemological rules of our time is to-unwittingly-invest our "will to truth" in apparatuses that work through powerful practices of exclusion and inclusion (see Foucault 1981, 54) ; then, I shall argue, it is exclusively within a liberal reality that defines Us by excluding an Other that "unplanned pregnancy" can be discovered as a pathological
